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IDAHO RULES AND STATUTES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case comes before this Court on appeal by the Plaintiff, Scott Beckstead
Real Estate Company and Scott Beckstead, following the derlial of his Motion for
Summary Judgment and the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
Defendant, City of Preston. The District Court heard the case on cross motions for
summary judgment submitted by the parties simultaneously. The District Court ruled
the Plaintiffs' claim was barred under the Idaho Tort Claim Act notice requirements and
the Plaintiffs had not complied with the City's Ordinance. An appeal was filed by the
Plaintiffs and a cross appeal was filed by the Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Scott Beckstead is a principal of Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company,

an ldaho Corporation, engaged in the business of selling and developing real estate
(hereafter Scott Beckstead, individually, and Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company
referred to collectively as "Beckstead"). In July of 2002, Beckstead purchased certain
real property located within the City of Preston (hereafter "City") for the purpose of
residential development. The name of the proposed subdivision was Creamery Hollow
Estates Subdivision. (Beckstead Affidavit, R.pp.lO1-102).
2.

In order to obtain approval for the subdivision, the City imposed the

requirement that Beckstead install 1,700 feet of twelve-inch pipe as part of the City's
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culinary mainline along 800 East in Preston, Idaho, an "off-site" location separated from
the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision by approximately one-quarter mile. On July
28, 2003, the City approved the final plat of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision
and the pipeline was installed by Beckstead in October of 2003. (Beckstead Affidavit, R.
pp.103-104).
3.

Since the pipeline Beckstead was to install connected to an existing six-

inch pipeline and the City wished to expand the size of the pipeline to meet future
needs, the City agreed to pay for the additional cost of purchasing a twelve-inch pipe as
opposed to the cost of purchasing six-inch pipe. The City did reimburse Beckstead for
the difference between the cost of twelve-inch pipe and six-inch pipe, but did not
reimburse Beckstead for the balance of the cost of putting in a new six-inch water line
as required by the City's Ordinance. (Beckstead Affidavit, R.p.104).
4.
\

Beckstead purchased twelve-inch pipe from two different suppliers for a

total cost of $13,910.24. He hired a backhoe service to perform labor and provide
equipment for excavation on the project. He paid the sum of $3,500.00 for backhoe
services. (Beckstead Affidavit, Ex. "B, " C and "D", R.pp. 104,ll I , 113 and 115).
5.

Beckstead provided labor and materials to install and connect the pipeline

for which a reasonable charge would be $1.65 per linear foot for a total of $2,805.00.
(Beckstead Affidavit, R.p.104).

Appellants' Brief - Page 2

6.

The City reimbursed Beckstead the sum of $7,061.60 for the difference in

costs between the twelve-inch pipe and six-inch pipe, leaving a balance of $13,153.64,
which has never been reimbursed to Beckstead. (R.p.104)
7.

During the course of discussing the requirements of the City for the

Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision, the City Engineer, Darrel Wilburn, confirmed to
Beckstead that pursuant to City Ordinance, Beckstead should be reimbursed the cost
of materials and labor used to construct and install the pipeline. (Beckstead Affidavit,
R.p.104).
8.

In October of 2004, for the first time, Beckstead learned that a water

connection was being sold by the City for a hookup to be made to the pipeline which
Beckstead had installed along 800 East. By letter dated October 22, 2004, Beckstead
made a claim to the City for reimbursement of the "off-site" improvements as mandated
by the City Ordinance. In response, Beckstead received a detailed letter from Clyde J.
Nelson, Preston City Attorney, dated November 16, 2004, denying his claim and stating
an agreement was needed with the City prior to beginning construction in order for
reimbursement to take place. Beckstead had not been made aware of any such
requirement for an agreement, written or otherwise, for the City Ordinance to be
effective. (Beckstead Affidavit with Ex's. " E"F" and "G", R.pp.105, 117 [the City
Ordinance], 119 and 121).
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9.

Based upon discovery responses, Beckstead became aware of additional

water connections that have been made to the pipeline Beckstead installed along 800
East. The actual physical connections to the City pipeline were made at various times
from 2004 through 2006. The time period such water connections were actually made
to the City water system are set forth in Exhibit "H"to the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead
(R.pp. 124-127).

ISSUESPRESENTED
1.

Did Beckstead comply with the notice requirement of the ldaho Tort

Claims Act?
2.

Did the City of Preston fail to comply with the purpose and intent of its

own ordinance when it refused to reimburse Beckstead for the costs of off-site
improvements made by him pursuant to City Ordinance?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 ldaho 851,727 P.2d 1279 (Ct. App. 1986).
When both parties to an action file cross motions for Summary Judgment relying
on the same facts, "...the parties effectively stipulate there is no genuine issue of
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material fact..." and the Court "...is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences
based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it...". Davis v. Peacock, 133
ldaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362 (1999).
In matters of summary judgment, an appellate court has possession of the
complete record and exercises free review over the subject matter and issues brought
before it. Determining the meaning and application of a statute is a matter over which
the Supreme Court has free review. L. W. Supply Corp v. Chartrand Family Trusf, 136
,

ldaho 738,40 P.3d 96 (2002)

ARGUMENT
1.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE TORT CLAIM NOTICE
PERIOD TO COMMENCE RUNNING WHEN BECKSTEAD FINISHED THE
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT.
The District Court held Beckstead's Notice of Tort Claim was untimely, since it

was sent October 22, 2004, a year after the construction project was completed. The
Court ignored the purpose and effect of Preston City Ordinance Section 16.28.030 B.
The full text of the ordinance is as follows:
Whenever any intervening property ("off-site") is benefitted by the
installation of any of the required facilities, the subdivider may pay
the costs of such facilities to the citv. such costs to be determined
by competitive bids solicited by thecity, together with verified
engineering costs reauired therefore. The Citv shall thereafter enter
a deferred credit in its books and records anishall charge the

-
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benefitted intervening property owners the fee rates for sewer and
water connections in effect at the time such connections are made.
Such fees shall then be returned to the subdivider to reimburse the
costs of the installation of the facilities; such agreement for
reimbursement shall extend for a maximum period of five years from
initial date of agreement after which time no further reimbursement
shall be made to the subdivider. The city may also elect to
reimburse the subdivider for such "off-site" facilities in full or inpert
after the subdivider has furnished the City with acceptable evidence
that an agreed number of housing units a-re occupied. No interest
shall accrue or become payable on such reimbursement.
Engineering drawings showing benefitted property shall be prepared
by the city engineer and copies forwarded to the sewer, water and
streets departments of the City. (Ord. 97-18 $9 1,2, 1997; Ord. 391
Ch. 4 §3, 1974).
(hereinafter referred to as the "City Ordinance")
In essence, the City Ordinance provides for reimbursement to a subdivider who
pays for the costs of required improvements, which costs are to be reimbursed over a
period of five years whenever "benefitted intervening property owners" connect to the
water or sewer system. As connection fees are paid, the subdivider is to be
reimbursed. If no connections are made to the facilities installed by the subdivider over
a five-year period, he will receive no compensation nor reimbursement.
The holding by the District Court would place the subdivider attempting to obtain
reimbursement in an impossible situation. If the subdivider were to file a tort claim
under ldaho Code §6-901 et. seq. (the ldaho Tort Claims Act, hereafter "ITCA), on the
day the project was completed, he would have no basis for such claim. Since no water
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connections had been made at that time, nor thereafter for a year, there would be no
compensable amount to claim. The City would have denied the claim since it owed
nothing to Beckstead and the statute of limitations would begin to run. Beckstead
would have been required to file a legal action against the City before the statute of
limitations had run even though it was quite possible no connections would had been
made to the pipeline during the limitations time period. What amount would Beckstead

.

have sued for had no connections yet been made to the pipeline he installed during the
period of the statute of limitations?
Under the ordinance, Beckstead had the right to claim reimbursement over a
five-year period. The District Court misapplied the notice requirements of the ITCA
stating that it somehow superceded the City's own reimbursement ordinance. The
District Court stated:
A municipal corporation may not enact ordinances which conflict
with State law. I.C. §50-301. Therefore, I.C. 96-609 will control as
between the five-year period granted by the City Ordinance and the
180-day deadline and Beckstead is subject to the 180-day deadline.
This is the case even if Beckstead complied with the City Ordinance.
(Memorandum Decision, R.p.278)
The City Ordinance was not intended to alter the notice requirements of the
ITCA, but instead was to provide a method of reimbursement to those subdividers who
had provided off-site improvements for the benefit of intervening property owners. The

-
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ordinance presented a fair and equitable way for private subdividers to be reimbursed
for improvements which would normally be constructed by the City. To be effective,
the notice requirements must be read in conjunction with the City Ordinance so they will
be consistent and avoid inequitable and harsh consequences. It appears the District
Court would impose its own 180-day requirement on the City Ordinance, making it
necessary for connections to be made to the water system within the 180 days following
the installation of the pipeline or costs could not be reimbursed. This makes little
sense, since cities are empowered to enact their own methods to pay for and handle
improvements to the their infrastructure.
The earliest possible date in which the ITCA notice period began to run would be
when Beckstead learned of the first connection made to the pipeline in October of
2003. at this point, for the first time, monies would be owed to him. By the City
Ordinance, he was allowed a period of five years to obtain reimbursement for the
construction of his off-site improvements. If anything, Beckstead should have the entire
five years in which to collect reimbursement and the time for providing a notice would
begin running at the end of the five-year period. In Farber v. Sfafe of Idaho, 102 ldaho
398,401-402, 630 P.2d 685,688-689 (1981), the Supreme Court reviewed a case in
which the owners of a building brought an action against the State and others for
negligent planning, construction and design of a street reconstruction project and
sought damages for condemnation of a portion of their property. The District Court
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granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to timely file a notice of claim under the
ITCA, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case back to the
District Court. At issue was whether or not the plaintiffs had to file their notice of claim
before the project was completed or whether they could wait until the project was done
before triggering the notice of claim statute. The Court stated:
Unless the contract and all the acts performed pursuant to the
contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the State to
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare defense to
any claim. Furthermore, if parties can present the State with a
complete and definite claim for damages arising from the continuing
tort, then the State may attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly
ascertainable facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, settlements
would either be based on pre-completion speculative damages, or
would have to await the completion of the project. A strict or literal
interpretation of the notice requirements of ITCA would result in
denying the legitimate claims of those who have suffered injury at
the hands of the State, without furthering in the least the legislative
purposes behind the statute.

Secondly, our interpretation of I.C. $6-905 as it applies to continuing
to& arising out of projects for which the State contracts, is
consistent with out announced policy of liberally construing statutes
'with a view to accomplishing their aims and purposes, and
obtaining substantial justice', Keenan v. Price, 68 ldaho 423,438, 195
P.2d 662, 270 (1948), and our generally liberal approach to
interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA. See, e.g., Smith v.
City of Preston, 99 ldaho 618,586 P.2d 1062 (1978).
If the word "ordinance" is substituted for the word "contract" in the above
quotation, it becomes clear Beckstead would have had a minimum of 180 days after the
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first connection was made to the pipeline, if not the entire five years from the day he
completed the project to file his notice of claim. To have filed a claim when he
completed the project would have been useless and speculative, at best, since it was
impossible to know how many water connections, if any, would be made to the pipeline.
If no connections were made to the pipeline installed by Beckstead during the five-year
period prescribed in the City Ordinance, he would have no claim whatsoever against
the City for any reimbursement. The unreasonably strict and literal interpretation of the
notice requirements of the ITCA imposed by the District Court has resulted in denying
the legitimate claim of Mr. Beckstead who has suffered injury at the hands of the City.
Following such an interpretation would not further "...in the least the legislative purposes
behind the statute". (Farber, supra).
Both the District Court and the City rely on the case of Magnuson Properties v.
City of Couerd' Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002) as support for their position.
We also think the Magnuson case is on point, but for a different reason. In Magnuson,
the City required the developer to extend a sewer line from property owned by the City
to an adjoining parcel owned by a third party. He objected because the extension
increased his cost and provided no benefit to him. Magnuson claimed the city engineer
agreed he would be reimbursed for the additional costs associated with the extension.
Magnuson's contractor sent a letter to the City of Couer d' Alene on May 10, 1996,
asking for reimbursement for his additional costs in installing the sewer line. On August
Appellants' Brief - Page 10

13, 1996, the City sent a letter to Magnuson ,denying the existence of any agreement
between the City and Magnuson and rejected his request for reimbursement.
Magnuson then sent a notice of tort claim on February 18, 1997, which the Court held
was beyond the 180-day notice period. The Supreme Court upheld the District Court's
decision stating the 180-day period for the filing of a tort claim notice began running on
the day the City sent its letter of denial to Magnuson. What the District Court ignored in
the Beckstead case is the statement in the Maanuson opinion at page 170 in which the
Court said:
The record reflects that, at the very latest, Magnuson had knowledge
of the City's August 13,1996 letter. On August 15,1996, which
places Magnuson's February 18,1997 notice beyond the 180-day
period. The City's letter denies the existence of any agreement
between the city and Magnuson and rejects Magnuson's request for
reimbursement. As of August 15,1996, a reasonable and prudent
person would have knowledge of facts of a wrongful act, i:e., the
City's denial of andlor breach of the alleged contract. Therefore, the
180-day notice period began on August 15,1996, and Magnuson
failed to provide timely notice of its claim.
7

-

Arguably, Magnuson's May 10, 1996 letter asking for reimbursement
was a notice of claim for purposes of the ITCA. However, because
this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, this Court will
not consider it.
The focus of the Nlaanuson Court was not on when Magnuson completed the
installation of the sewer line (which apparently took place some time prior to May 10,
1996), but on the date the City first denied Magnuson's request for reimbursement

-
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which was August 13, 1996. Under the facts of the present case, Beckstead made his
claim by letter on October 22, 2004 with the first denial letter coming from the City
dated November 16, 2004. Under the Masnuson holding, Beckstead's letter/claim, or
at the latest, the denial letter of the City, triggered the notice requirements of the ITCA
and the statute of limitations would begin to run.
Justices Eisman and Walters in their concurring opinion at P.171 elaborated
further on the erroneous position taken by Magnuson:
Here the City denied the claim on August 13,1996, some 95 days
after May 10. The City's reason for rejecting the claim is irrelevant.
At that point, in my opinion, Magnuson was free to file an action to
collect on the rejected claim. Magnuson did not need to later send in
a second claim addressing the same dispute when that claim had
already been denied by operation of the terms of the pertinent
statute and by the City's rejection in fact.
However, Magnuson chose not to rely on the May 10 letter as a
notice of claim. Instead, Magnuson continued to pursue discussions
with the City in an attempt to receive reimbursement for its projected
costs. When Magnuson's attempts proved futile, Magnuson sent
another demand notice in February, 1997, and then filed suit when
that demand was rejected. As it turned out, of course, the February,
1997 Notice of Claim was held untimely by the District Court upon
the facts as presented and argued by the parties in this case.

Because Magnuson decided to proceed under its own interpretation
of the steps to be followed without suggesting to the Courts the
correct alternative route, this Court is not required to reconstruct the
case and put it on the proper track.
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Beckstead did not make this strategic error. His letter of October 22, 2004, was
clearly a claim for reimbursement for the installation of the costs of putting in the off-site
improvements pursuant to the City Ordinance, and even more importantly, the City
recognized it as such as evidenced by its letter denying his claim dated November 16,
2004. (Beckstead Affidavit, Ex. "F" and " G , R.pp. 105, 119 and 121-122). Throughout
the proceedings before the District Court, Beckstead has taken the position his letter of
October 22, 2004 was a notice of claim under the ITCA.
The claim filed by Beckstead was certainly adequate to put the City on notice he
was requesting reimbursement for his costs (which had already been provided to the
City when the project was completed, (see Beckstead 3"' Affidavit R.pp. 270-273), and
the City was no way misled as to the nature of his claim. The City's own letter of denial,
just as in Magnuson, was sufficient to show the City understood the claim by Beckstead
and that Beckstead was then free to file an action to collect on the rejected claim.

!I.

THE CITY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF ITS
OWN ORDINANCE IN DENYING BECKSTEAD REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE
OFF-SITE IMPROVEMENTS.
In its interpretation of City Ordinance 16.28.030(B), the District Court found the

ordinance to be ambiguous, especially regarding the use of the word "may" in the first
sentence. The Court also noted ambiguity must be construed against the drafter, but
then made a leap of judicial interpretation by stating such wording made little difference,
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since Beckstead had only one of two options, "...either to pay the costs and invoke the
ordinance, or not to pay the costs and forego the reimbursement provided under the
ordinance". (Memorandum Decision, R.p. 276). Such wording does not exist in the
ordinance. The District Court also ignored the clear intent of the ordinance, which was
to reimburse subdividers for constructing "off-site" improvements, in favor of its own
technical interpretation in order to arrive at a result which denies the very purpose of
why the ordinance was placed in existence. A close examination of the ordinance is
warranted.
The first phrase of the ordinance states, "Whenever any intervening property
("off-site") is benefitted by the installation of any of the required facilities,

..."

(emphasis added). The first phrase uses very broad and all encompassing language.
Use of the words "whenever" and "any" removes any narrow distinctions or technical
interpretations as to time periods and who the City should reimburse for off-site
improvements. The Supreme Court has indicated when the word "any" is placed in a
statute, the statute "...should not receive at our hands a technical or limited
construction; but on the other hand, we should so construe the word with reference to
the enactment of the law upon this subject as to be in harmony with the intention of the
legislature. Plaff v. City of Payeffe, 19 Idaho 470, 114 P. 25, 27 (1911). It would be
disingenuous to argue the purpose of the ordinance was not to apply to exactly the
circumstances before the City under this pipeline project. Beckstead installed 1,700
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feet of pipe to which other "intervening property" owners could benefit by connecting
their water lines to a new twelve-inch pipeline which now belongs to the City.
The next phrase of the ordinance is that part over which the District Court
struggled. It states, "...the subdivider mav pay the cost of such facilities to the
City, such costs to be determined by competitive bids solicited by the City
together with verified engineering costs required therefore". (emphasis added).

Nowhere does it state if the subdivider pays the costs directly, he forgoes any
right to reimbursement. The key word in this phrase is "may" which is permissive or
nonmandatory in nature as opposed to words such as "shall" or "will" which could have
been used but were not. In other words, the City could have required Beckstead to do
competitive bids solicited by the City with verified engineering costs or it did not have to
require such actions. In this case, the City did not obtain competitive bids nor verified
engineering costs. The District Court and the City places the entire burden on
Beckstead to have initiated such actions, however, the ordinance states competitive
bids and engineering costs are to be "solicited bv the Citv". Again, the word "may" does
not make these requirements mandatory. The Supreme Court in Rife v. Long, 127
Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) held that a statute stating a school board
"may" authorize safety patrols made the creation of such patrols "permissive" in nature.
The Court stated:
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This Court has interpreted the meaning of the word "may" appearing
in legislation, as having the meaning or expressing the right to
exercise discretion. Id. When used in a statute, the word "may" is
permissive rather than the imperative or mandatory meaning of
"must" or "shall". Sfate v. Bunting Tractor Company, 58 Idaho 617,
77 P.2d 464 (1938).
Under the rules of statutory construction, words must be given their plain
meaning. If the drafters of the City Ordinance intended this to be a mandatory
requirement, the words "shali" or "must" should have been used. Bone v. City of
Lewiston, 107 ldaho 844, 849, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984 . Notably, the drafters of the
ordinance used the word "shall" in all other sentences in the ordinance, but the word
"may" was only used in conjunction with competitive bidding and engineering costs.
Courts are to first look at the literal language of the ordinances and then analyze it
within the context of the whole ordinance. Why would the drafters have used the word
"may" when other sentences contain the word "shall"? If the wording in the ordinance is
considered significant, then the reasonable explanation for the use of the word "may" is
that what follows is not mandatory.
The next sentence of the Ordinance contains language making the duty to the
subdivider mandatory in contrast to the permissive language used in the preceding
phrase. The Ordinance states,
The City shall thereafter enter a deferred credit in its books and
records and shall charge the benefitted intervening property owners
the fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time

-
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such connections are made. Such fees shall then be returned to the
subdivider to reimburse the costs of the installation of the facilities;
I
for a maximum
such agreement for reimbursement &,&extend
period of five years from initial date of agreement after which time no
further reimbursement shall be made to the subdivider". (emphasis
added)

As opposed to the use of the word "may" the use of the word "shall" leaves no
question as to the duty of the City to Beckstead when he installed the pipeline
benefitting not only the City, but the intervening property owners whose fees should
have been used to reimburse Beckstead. Once the words "shall" were placed in the
ordinance, the City was no longer given the right to arbitrarily deny Beckstead
reimbursement.
At no time did the City solicit competitive bidding or engineering nor that the
costs of the facilities had to be paid to the City. It is incumbent upon the City to know its
own ordinances and to make such requirements known to the subdivider, if the City
wishes to make such requirements mandatory. No form, no letter, nothing was given to
Beckstead which would have placed him on notice the City was making mandatory
competitive bidding and payment to the City a requirement of his project. The City
knew full well Beckstead was paying for the project and would obtain his own pricing for
materials as evidenced by the City's reimbursement to Beckstead for the costs of over
sizing the pipe to twelve inches in diameter. The City did not object to the prices he
obtained. The City could well have determined there was no need for competitive
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bidding, engineering drawings or detailed schematics, since the cost of the pipe was
submitted to the City without objection and installation of the pipe was relatively simple.
The City also had its own engineer to oversee any aspects of the project it so desired.
(Beckstead Affidavit, R. pp. 270-273).
The overarching principle of statutory construction established in ldaho case law
is that the Court is to first determine the intent of the ordinance or statute. The intent of
the City Ordinance in this case is crystal clear. Sudividers who have installed off-site
improvements such as water lines and sewer lines shall be reimbursed their costs over
a period of five years from the fees generated from those who subsequently connect to
the water line or sewer line constructed by the subdivider. Once the purpose and intent
of the ordinance is established, then Courts should not derail that intent through
technical or limited construction in order to avoid the very purpose for which the
ordinance was created. No ordinance shall be so construed as to "...lead to absurd or
reasonably harsh results...". Payetfe River Property Owners Association v. Board of
Commissioners of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477,483 (1999);
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 ldaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9,14 (2002)
and Ada County v. Gibson, 126 ldaho 854,856, 893 P.2d 801, 803 (App. 1995).
Because the City did not require competitive bids or payment for the improvements to
be made directly to the City, the City and the District Court would toss out the core
intent of the Ordinance requiring reimbursement, completely leaving Beckstead to bear
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the entire cost of the pipeline installed for the benefit of others. This could only be
described as an "unnecessarily harsh consequence".
Beckstead, as the subdivider, and the person who paid for and installed the
pipeline, certainly comes within the context and object of the City's Ordinance. The City
has pocketed the fees collected from the "intervening property" owners but now wishes
to escape the obligation of its own ordinance, leaving Beckstead "holding the bag" with
his only recourse to seek protection from the Courts.
Ill.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING WOULD RESULT IN A WINDFALL TO THE
ClTY FOR WHICH BECKSTEAD SHOULD BE REIMBURSED UNDER THE
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
The District Court did not treat the issue as to whether or not installation of the

pipeline by Beckstead as an off-site improvement resulted in a windfall to the City.
Normally, the City is responsible for the cost and installation of its primary mainlines for
culinary water purposes. In this case, the City made it mandatory for Beckstead to
install and pay for the pipeline even though he received no direct benefit from it while
the City continues to collect connection fees for the pipeline he installed. Obviously, the
pipeline would be of great benefit to intervening property owners making connections to
the pipeline and would improve the City's water distribution system. How can the City
be allowed to retain this windfall without reimbursement to Beckstead? To allow the
City to retain the benefit of the pipeline without compensating Beckstead would be
inequitable and unjust. In Sfephens v. Cify o f Notus, 101 ldaho 101, 102, 609 P.2d

168, 169 (1980) the ldaho Supreme Court upheld the District Court's award of
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expenses a private developer incurred when he installed water and sewer systems at
his own expense and the City benefitted from his action. The Court stated:
Although Defendants argue that no written agreement was executed
between the parties, unjust enrichment does not depend upon the
existence of a valid contract. Continental Forest Products v.
Chandler, 95 ldaho 739,518 P.2d 1201 (1974).
The essence of the quasi-contractural theory of unjust enrichment is
that the Defendant has received a benefit which would be inequitable
to retain at least without compensating the Plaintiff to the extent that
retention is unjust. Chandler, Supra; Bair v. Barron, 97 ldaho 26, 539
P.2d 578 (1975). Cf. Bastian v. Gafford, 98 ldaho 324, 563 P.2d 48
(1977).

We are not at all persuaded by the argument of Notus that Stephens
voluntarily went to the expense of laying pipe throughout the entire
subdivision because of the increased value of the lots, which he
presumably recovered when he sold them.
It wouid be manifestly unjust to allow the City to retain the benefit it derived from
Beckstead's installation of the pipeline without full reimbursement to him

IV.

BECKSTEAD SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 912-117 AND 312-120.
ldaho Code $12-117 has been interpreted to mean:

...One of the purposes of this section is to provide a remedy for persons who
have borne unfair and unjustified financial burden attempting to correct
mistakes agencies never should have made. Bogner v. State Deparfment of
Revenue and Taxation, 107 ldaho 854,859,693 P.2d 1056,1061 (1984).
Fisher v. City of Ketchum, 141 ldaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005) and Friends
of Farm fo Market, supra at P.201.

-
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Under Idaho Code §12-120, Beckstead should also be allowed to recover his
attorneys fees and costs should he prevail in this action.
In this case, Beckstead has been required to bear the financial burden of paying for
and installing the pipeline along 800 East in Preston, Idaho, without just reimbursement for
no real reason other than the City did not want to pay him for the pipeline. The City has
greatly benefitted from the installation of the pipeline and has received connection fees
which it has retained despite the fact Beckstead paid for the pipeline. It is fair and just that
Beckstead be reimbursed, not only forthe costs of the pipeline, but for being forced to hire
counsel to enforce the City's own ordinance. The legal action brought by Beckstead is to
correct the mistake or failure of the City to reimburse him, which mistake should never
have been made.

CONCLUSION

For the District Court to rule Beckstead should have sent a tort claim notice to the
City within 180 days from the date construction was completed on the pipeline project is
both irrational and unreasonable. The purpose and requirements of the ITCA must be
applied within the context of the City Ordinance. Upon completion of the pipeline project,
no claim existed and the City had no duty to pay anything to Beckstead. Only upon
connections being made to the pipeline over a period of five years would Beckstead ever
have a viable claim against the City for the reimbursement of his costs. If no water
connections were made to the pipeline during the five-year period, Beckstead would have
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had no claim whatsoever. If he had filed a claim according to the district Court's ruling,
would the City have had any obligation to pay him anything at that time? Obviously, not.
if the statute of limitations had begun to run and no connections were made to the pipeline
during the limitations period, would he have been required to sue the City for monies that
were not due? The interpretation of the notice requirements of the ITCA by the District
Court would turn the purpose of that statute on its head and would make a mockery of the
law. Application of the ITCA to the circumstances of this case should not be so rigid and
unyielding as to require a result that makes no sense.
The purpose of the City Ordinance, its aim, object and design, was to provide for a
method of reimbursement to a subdivider whenever the City imposed a requirement to
make improvementswhich would benefit intervening property owners, with the Ordinance's
method of reimbursement to accomplish what would normally fall under the City's
responsibilities. It is not uncommon for governmental entities, utility companies or others
to create an ordinance or policy sharing the burden of costs associated with extending
pipelines, electrical lines or gas lines. When the City Ordinance is read as a whole, its
purpose and intent are clearly met by the circumstances involved with the Beckstead
pipeline construction project. To allow a technical and unwarranted construction of the
ordinance to wipe out his right of reimbursement would be contrary to the express intent
of the ordinance. Those portions of the ordinance which are permissive should not be
made mandatory and those portions of the ordinance which are clearly mandatory should
not be ignored.

-
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Much has been said in the briefing and oral arguments before the District Court
about the duty and responsibility of Beckstead toward the City, but what of the duty of the
City toward Beckstead? Does not a City owe its citizens a duty to carry out, and obey its
own ordinances? To allow the City to escape responsibility under its own ordinance for
reimbursement of the pipeline in this case would amount to an unjust windfall to the City
which now has 1,700 feet of new pipe to which others have connected to the City's water
system for which the City has collected fees, but refuses to pay for the costs. The only
place a citizen may look for protection from a governmental entity which is ignoring the
responsibility it has towards one of its citizens is an appeal to the Courts.
It is respectfully requested the District Court's ruling be overturned and the City be
required to reimburse Beckstead for the costs and labor he incurred in installing the
pipeline and for his attorneys fees and costs in having to pursue this matter.

&

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s a day of March, 2008.

Attorney for Appellants
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